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Empirical evidence indicates a close association between
multinational firms and knowledge capital, a public good within
the firm. We model a firm which wishes to exploit its knowledge
capital abroad, but whose workers learn all the knowledge
necessary for production and can defect and produce the good
themselves. The home firm must then choose between costly
exporting and the possible dissipation of its knowledge capital
by producing abroad. The paper examines the choice between
exporting, licensing, and acquiring a subsidiary in this
environment. We analyze the cost and technology parameters that
support the alternative modes of serving the foreign market, and
we describe the international equilibrium that jointly determines
the pattern of specialization and the market mode.
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I. Introduction
THIS PAPER ADDRESSES the nexus of increasing returns to scale, international trade, growth
and technological competition and dissemination.1 Much recent literature has endogenized
the rate of growth, technological change and the pattern of specialization. We instead
endogenize market structure and link it to the international dissemination of knowledge.
Multinational enterprises (MNEs) are dosely linked to knowledge-based capital,2 whose
services are easily transported between distant locations (managers and engineers visiting
plants) relative to the services of physical capital. Knowledge-based capital often facilitates
multi-plant production (blueprints or chemical formulae are costlessly supplied to additional
plants). It is not surprising then to find an association between MNEs and the production of
high-tech, R&D intensive goods. This association is central to this paper. Also central is the
choice of mode under which the firm services a foreign market. We consider three choices:
(1) exporting, (2) licensing a foreign firm, and (3) establishing a subsidiary (i.e., becoming a
true MNE). The theory of the MNE is, or should be, first of all a theory of endogenous firm
organization and endogenous market structure.
We model home firms that continually compete to introduce new products. A successful
home firm has a proprietary advantage in its new product for just two periods and must decide
how to exploit this advantage abroad. The firm chooses between exporting the good
embodying the knowledge and exporting the knowledge itself to a subsidiary or licensee.
Foreign production gives the foreign producer the knowledge needed for future production.
We assume the complete absence of protection for 9ntellectual property (knowledge capital)
1in the foreign country. The MNE must then choose between costly exporting and the possible
dissipation of its proprietary asset. We address these points in a dynamic model in which
homefirmscontinually introduce new products. We analyze what underlying characteristics
of the technology and market support alternative modes of serving that market.
We assume that a licensing contract is product specific whereas a subsidiary arrangement
is firm specific. Thus a license does not embody any future commitments to future products
of the home firm. Subject to incentive compatibility constraints on both the home firm and the
subsidiary, the MNE contract gives the subsidiary rights to all future products as long as
neither the home firm nor the subsidiary repudiates the agreement.3 For this commitment to
be valuable the subsidiary must earn positive rents from each product. Conversely, if the
home firm and the licensee find no value in an (incentive compatible) commitment to future
products, the home firm may be extracting all rents on each product.
We show that there are five distinct equilibrium outcomes possible for a given product: (1)
the home firm exporting in both periods, (2) a two-period license with a foreign producer, (3)
a subsidiary arrangement. (4) exporting in the first period followed by a one period license in
the second, or (5) two successive one-period licenses with distinct foreign firms. Other potential
arrangements are inconsistent with equilibrium. In situations where (1), (2) or (3) are chosen,
all rents are extracted from the foreign market. Contract (3) involves sharing of rents between
the home firm and the subsidiary while the home firm captures all rents in (1) and (2). With
(4) and (5) some rents are dissipated but the licensee(s) earn no rents. The home firm is better
off dissipating some rents than sharing the maximum rents with a subsidiary.
Results suggest how the type of equilibrium relates to the importance of pure-public-good
knowledge capital (intellectual property) relative to the fixed cost of foreign production, the
discount rate, the transfer costs to exporting, the foreign wage relative to the home wage, and
the number of home firms competing to introduce new goods. The latter two variables are
endogenous to our model, so we use their relation to the equilibrium type to solve for the full
international equilibrium. This is then used to describe the influence of home and foreign
2market sizeonthepatternof international specialization, equilibriummarketmode,relative
wages and equilibriumintensityof research.
II. The Basic Model
Assume two countries, H and F, each exogenously endowedwitha single factor of
production, labor, immobile betweencountries. Firms in Huselabor toconductresearch and
toproduce goods; firms in Fareassumed unable toconductresearch and only produce goods.
A. New Products
Firms in H that conduct research enter a two-period race to develop a new product, with
punitsof H labor perperiodnecessary for research; the firm with the best results wins,
capturing for itself the ability to produce the next generation of new goods. Er ante each
project is equally likelytosucceed, so if Nfirmstry, theprobabilityof success is 1/Nforeach.4
The winner acquires exclusive knowledge of how to producethe new product plus a plant in
Hto manufacturethat product at constant marginal cost.The productwill remain new for two
periods and thenbecome old upon the appearance of the next generation new product. We
assumethat the firmmust supply the H market from itsplantlocated there, andthatitcan
preventanyone elsefromproducing the product in H for the two-periodduration ofits
newness. The firm can supply the F marketeitherby exportingfrom its plant in H or by local
productionin F. The latter might be done by the H firm itself employinglaborin F at a
subsidiary,orbyaflrminFlicensedbythehomefirm.
Knowledge of how to produce a new product disseminatesgradually.in the firstperiod,
only the H firm that developed the product knows how. Anyone involved in producingthe
gc d in the first period canproduceit in the second. Thusfirst-periodfranchisees or
subsidiaryemployeescan now produce it themselves. After the second period, knowledge
becomes common: any firm in eitherHor F can produceit, and it ceasestobe new.
3As long as the product remains new, production in either location involves a per-period
fixed labor cost C plus a constant marginal cost of one unit of labor. Since the firm must
supply H from its home plant, the fixed cost there is not relevant to exports, but exporting
does involve an additional constant transfer cost t per unit, in terms of H labor.
Our model posits that the services of the knowledge-based capital resulting from the firm's
research project can be costlessly supplied to foreign producers, and so C reflects additional
input needed for production of a good that, because of its newness, may require unusual
facilities or a monitoring effort independent of the length of the production run. These inputs
will no longer be required when production becomes standardized, that is, when the good
becomes old. Higher values of G indicate that the publicgood aspect of knowledge is less
important (i.e., knowledge is a less-pure public good).
We assume externalities to research. The externality influences all firms equally, so it does
not affect the probability of success for any firm. We therefore assume that the externalities
simply lower the fixed costs associated with the new good that is developed. That is, G is
decreasing in N (and at a decreasing rate): G —G(N)with C' <0and G' >0.
B. TheMarket for New Goods in F
Nowconsider demand conditions in F. Assume F has a large number L of identical
consumers, each receiving the per capita income I. In particular, each individual has the
following utility function.
(1)
Herec>Iis the value placed on newness and Y, consumption of the good that was new
generations ago5. The budget constraint is
4l￿pY+EwY (2)
where p and w are the prices of new and old goods respectively. The market for old goods is
competitive and they will be produced in F in any equilibrium that we will examine. Thus w
will equal the wage in F. Taking first-order conditions of (1) subject to (2) gives the following.
:>i y_i—i...
Thus only new goods and the newest generation of old goods are actually demanded and so
produced in equilibrium. Since there are a total of L consumers in F, the total demand for new
goods is given by y —LY.This gives the following inverse demand function.
.E.—c—by,whereb—I. (4)
w L
The H firm may supply the F market as a monopolist directly from production in H or
indirectly from production in F by a licensee or subsidiary. In either case, revenue and
marginal revenue for a monopoly firm are given by
py -(cy-by2)w,MR -(c-2by)w. ()
Setting marginal revenue equal to marginal cost w determines y, p and therefore profits if F is







If F is supplied by production in H, the marginal cost is instead I +fbut the fixed cost G need
not be incurred. We normalize the wage in H to unity: H labor is the numeráire and w the
ratio of F wages to H wages. Since F will produce old goods in any equilibrium, w ￿ I. Then
the monopoly rent becomes E.
5E_Wm)
(7)
Here in —(I+t)/w;m >Ican be thought of as the marginal cost of serving F by exports
relative to the cost of producing in F.
If H takes on a local partner during the first period, that partner will be able to produce new
goods on its own in the second period. So consider the profits of each of two identical firms,
both located in F, in a Cournot-Nash equilibrium. Let R denote total duopoly profit.
—(c—I)2—G (8)
2 9b
Comparing the monopoly profit to the duopoly profit of each firm and of the two firms
together:
R — — 5(c—l)2 (9)
2 36b
R —R*— [(C_i)2 + G).
(10)
Finally, we derive the Cournot-Nash duopoly profit, for the two firms together (El and for
each individually, if the only difference between the two is that one produces in H and one
produces in F. Let a denote H's share of E.
6Es — w[(c—m)— (m—1)12+w[(c—i) +(rn—i)]2—wG (ii)
aE —w((c — m) — (m — 1)12 (12)
9b
(I
—a)E * —w((c —1)+(m — 1)12— wG (13)
9b
Homeexports must at least cover their cost for (12) to describe equilibrium, and this requires
thatc-rnnotbe less thanm-1. Thisinturnmeansthatc-1 ￿2(rn-1),andutilizing this
relation in a comparison of (6) and (13) reveals that R ￿ (1a)E*. Aiso R exceeds R from (10),
and (ia)E*R/2 from (8) and (13). On the other hand, the model implies no necessary
relation between E and R5.
III.Choice of Supply Mode
Wenow consider the H firm's choice of how to supply the F market while its products
remain new. First we describe the alternatives, then we consider when each might be chosen.
Two features of our model are crucial in deciding which arrangements are feasible.
Only a single H firm can initially produce new goods, but many F firmscompetewith each other,
so H can dictate the terms of any agreement.
H cannot prevent a first -period partner from producing new goods in competition with H in the second
period. Nor can the F partner prevent Hfrom exporting on it $ownorfroin taking on a new partner
in the second period.
In this section w and N will be treated as exogenous parameters; they will then be endogenized
in Section V.
7A. Alternative Supply Arrangements
Hmight simply export during both periods, earning E in each for total discounted earnings
of E(1+d). Alternatively, I-! might export in the first period and license a firm in F during the
second. The licensee during that second period could earn R, which H could extract as a
license fee, since there are many potential partners in F. Thus I-I earns E +dRover the two
periods (the fact that the licensee learns about the product is of no consequence, since that
knowledge becomes common after the second period).
Alternatively, H might license a firm in F for both periods, earning Q1+ dQ2,where (Q,Q2)
denotesthe two-period negotiated royalty schedule. The license might instead extend only
over the first period, during which H earns the fee Q.Inthe second period H would then
have to compete with its former licensee, earning aE if it did so by exporting, or the fee Q
ifit instead licensed another foreign firm during the second period.
The final possibility is for H to become an MNE by establishing a foreign subsidiary. H
would agree to pay its employees in F total compensation of C1 and C2 in the respective
periods. Let the two-period payments received by the firm from the subsidiary be given by
Q1andQ2,witha present value of Q,+ dQ2.The subsidiary's employees then receive C1 +
dC2
—(R-Q1) + d(R-Q2).' TheMNE would be a permanent arrangement, providing for the
exploitation by its employees in F of any future new goods developed by H.
Table I lists the possible alternatives with their implied payoffs. The earnings entries record
total two-period discounted earnings of the respective firms. F1 refers to foreign participants
in an arrangement during period I, and perhaps in period 2 also; F2 refers to a foreign
participant only in the second period.
8Table 1
AlternativeArrangements
ARRANGEMENT H EARNINGSF1 EARNINGSF1 EARNINGS
Exporting E(1+d) 0 0
Exporting, then Licensing E + dR 0 0
Licensing, then Exporting Q +daE' R-Q + dCla)E* 0
Successive One-Penod Licenses Q +dQ' R-Q + d(R,2) d((R*t2) -Q)
Two-Period License Q +dQ R-Q1 + d(R-Q2) 0
MNE R-C + d(R-C3) C1 + dC2 0
B. ExportingEquilibria
Different parameterizations support different outcomes, and this relationship between
parameters and outcomes (market structures) is what interests us. We illustrate the results in
Figure 1, a parameter space in two key variables: R, total rents available in the foreign market.
and (1-a)E, the return to the foreign licensee/subsidiary from defecting in the second period.
Recall that our assumptions imply that R>(1-a)E> R12andR>R*, sothe relevant region
in Figure 1 is restricted to below the 45° line, above the (1-a)E — R*12line,and to the right
of the R — R*line.Point A denotes that point in the plane where R—Rand(1.a)E — R!2.
(Theorigin (0,0) is off the figure to the left, on the 45°line). The case R > 0 is reflected in the
figure by the fact that A is below the 45° line. The two other restrictions noted below the
figure will be discussed in due course.
Suppose first that R < E. Then there exists no contract whichsomeF would accept that










































 XX is the locust where R —E.Thus to the left of XX, exporting is chosen for both periods.
To the right of XX H will never choose to export in both periods, because if it exports in period
one a license will dominate exporting in period two. We summarize.
ProposItion 1: If R < E, exporting in both periods is the equilibrium. If R > E, exporting takes place
in at most one period.
C.Two-PeriodUcensesin Equilibrium
Considernext the two-period licensing option, and reason backwards, assuming first that
H would respect the contract and asking whether F would. F would prefer a duopoly rather
than to go-it-alone if and only if (1.a)E* > 0. Consider this case first and evaluate whether F
would violate a two-period license. Consider the fee schedule
Q1— R+ (1 —a)£ * d, Q2— R—(1
—a)£. (14)
This schedule gives F no incentive to violate or to go-it-alone. H will not defect either if Q1>
R12,the maximum Q*thatH could extract from a second licensee. Thus
R—(1—a)Es > (15)
supports a two period license (TPL) if H offers it. Note from (14) that H's total return is Q1+
Q2d —R(1+d),so H captures all rents. Thus under (14), (15), and (1-a)E > 0, TPL is the
equilibrium. Locus LL in Figure 1 gives (15) with equality. This locus is parallel to the 450
line. Points (to the right of XX) below LL give TPL as the equilibrium. Note finally that points
above LL cannot support a two period licensing contract. There is no second-period license
fee that would not cause either H or F to violate.
10The above argument applies when (1.a)E* > 0, as in Figure 1, but the conclusion does not
depend on this. Suppose that 0 > (1-a)E > R12.Thefee schedule (14) will not work here,
because it would induce F to walk away in the second period. Here a feasible schedule is
Q1—Q2—R. (16)
F has no incentive to reject or to violate in the second period. H collects all rents so that this
contract is preferred to exporting or to an MNE. But might H violate in the second period?
If F responds by going-it-alone, (R*/2 < 0), then H earns R from the second licensee, so that
H is no better off than honoring contract (16). 11 F responds by playing duopoly (R/2 > 0),
H will violate only if R*12 > R, which contradicts (9). The fee schedule (16) thus supports TPL
as the equilibrium the right of )O( when (1a)E* and R* are negative. Note finally that as R
and R*12 approach zero, the LL locus shifts left and approaches the 450 line. Thus with 0 ￿
(1a)E* > R12, TPL is indeed the only relevant contract.
Proposition 2: A two-period licensing crmtract (TPL) is the equüibrium to the right of XX and below
LL in Figure 1. Above LI,,. a two-period license can not be supported.
Therestriction R> E is a market-size restriction since a branch plant, whether owned by
the firm or by a licensee, is a high fixed cost choice while exporting is a high variable cost
choice. Then (R -E)grows with the size of the market. Similarly, R grows with the size of
the market.
D.A license Followed by Exporting
Tothe right of XX and above LL, a single-period license followed by exporting cannot be
an equilibrium. To see this, note that if H were to export in the second period, H would have
to compete with its former partner, since (1.a)E* > 0. 11 instead H were to issue a new second
period license,' that would generate a duopoly since R12> 0. In this case, H earns Q.The
Umaximum Q*thatH can extract from a second licensee is R*/2. Thus H would prefer a second
license to licensing followed by exporting if and only if
(17)
2
But the restriction that we are above LL implies that
> R —(1—a)Es￿ E* —(1—a)Es
—aE* (18)
if R ￿ E*. Referring back to equations (6) and (11), we can show that this inequality must
hold. The maximum value of E* occurs when the home firm cannot compete in this duopoly,
so that the defecting licensee earns (1-a)E —E—R.But this maximum value satisfies (18).
Proposition 3: A one-period license followed by exporting can never occur in equiltl'rium.
Anr equilibrium featuring a one-period license in the first production period will also feature
another license in the second period. We accordingly refer to this arrangement as successive
one-period licenses (SOPL). Table A2 in the Appendix lists and describes the loci in Figure 1.
E.MNE Equilibda
Considernext the choice between a subsidiary (MNE) and successive one-period licenses
(SOPL). For MNE to be feasible, F's two-period earnings must be great enough to induce F
to accept (19), F's second-period earnings must be great enough so that F does not defect (20),
and the second-period fee must be great enough that H does not defect (21):
(R —Q1) ÷ d(R
—Q2) ￿0 (19)
12(R —Q2) + X ￿(1 -a)E* (20)
￿ .._. (21)
V denotes the present value to F of the MNE arrangement beyond the current two periods.
In the future, the arrangement will be of value only when H succeeds in bringing out new
products, which happens with probability 1/N. V is accordingly given by
d2 (Q+dQ) d2 V —______ R— 1 2-
((1
+d)R
—(Q + Q d))
(1—d)N 1 +d (1 —d2)N
2
Notefirst that any earnings schedule (Q1,Q2) satisfying(19), (20), and (21) for which (19) is met
with equality implies that V —0. This means that the (Q.Q2) couldbe implemented as a TPL,
but this is impossible above LL. Thus any feasible schedule must imply a strict inequality in
(19),
To solve for the optimal MNE contract, note that H is indifferent to a repatriation schedule
change 1Q1 —-(d)iQ2 >0, and from (22) this leaves V unchanged as well. But it increases the
left-hand side of (20), allowing H to raise fees overall. The implication is that H optimizes in
a MNE agreement by setting the lowest level of Q2consistentwith (21), so Q2— R12.
Intuitively, keeping Q2aslow as possible minimizes F's incentive to defect in the second
period, and so allows H to keep a larger share of the rents.
To delineate the area in Figure 1 where such a schedule is optimal, substitute (21) and (22)






Rearrange (23) to obtain explicitly the discounted repatriation schedule (Q1+ dQ2),and then
set this equal to the return from successive one-period licenses, SOPL. In the latter case, the
maximum first-period fee is (R +dR*/2)and the discounted second-period fee (dQ*) is dRI2.
13Thus the lees from SOPL will be (R +dR*).Setting the MNE lees from (23) equal to the SOPL
lees,
(Q1+ dQ2) -(1-d)N (R--(1-a) £ j+ (1+d)R-R+dR* (24)
Rearrange this equation as follows.
d1 (1—a)E. —(R—_)+ (R—R*). (25) 2 (1—d2)N
Equation (25) gives the LV locus in Figure 1. Above LV, SOPL is preferred to MNE, while
below LV MNE is preferred to SOPL. Note that LV is steeper than LL and that LV has an
intercept on R —Ethat lies above the intercept of LL, provided that E >R.This latter case
is shown in Figure 1. Note also that on LV, F earns positive two-period rents in the amount
d(R -R*),so that (19) is automatically satisfied with a strict inequality.
Now turn to the choice between an MNE contract and XSPL. Earnings from XSFL will
equal E +dQ2—E+dRsince H can extract all rents in the second period. Earnings from the








Equation(27) is expressed in Figure 1 as locus MM. Note that (Q1+ dQ2) — (E + dR)implies
that F captures rents (R -E)and so (19) is again satisfied. XSPL is preferred to MNE above
MM and MNE is preferred to XSPL below MM. Note that MM and LL have the same intercept
on R —E,and that MM is steeper than either LL or LV. Thus the relationships among MM,
LV, and LL must be as shown in Figure 1, provided that E >R.
14Proposition 4: MNE is the equilibrium in Figure 1 above LL and below MM and LV.
F.One-Period Licenses in Equilibrium
Nowconsider the region above LL, and above either MM or LV in Figure 1. In this region,
a two-period license cannot be an equilibrium (we are above LL) and MNE cannot be an
equilibrium (we are above MM or LV). Thus the equilibrium must be either XSPL or SOPL.
For SOI'L to be an equilibrium, Qmustbe small enough to induce F to accept the first-period




H will prefer SOPL to XSPL if and only if the sum of the right hand sides of (28) and (29)
exceeds E +dR.
dRs +(1-d)R>E. (30)
The locus of points in which (30) holds with equality is given by XL in Figure 1. Since R> R
from (6) and (8), XL must lie to the right of XX, provided once again that E >R.LV, MM,
and XL intersect as they logically must (i.e., the intersection of MM and LV implies that H is
indifferent between MNE and XSPL, and also indifferent between MNE and SOPL, so H is
necessarily indifferent also between XSPL and SOPL: a point on XL).
Proposifion5: IntheregionofFigurelaboveLL,andaboveeitherMMorLV,XSPL orXisthe
equilibrium to the left of XL and SOPL is the equilibrium to the rightof XL
15For all of the cases mentioned in Proposition 5 to be feasible possibilities, it is necessary that
the common intersection of LV, MM and XL lie in the feasible zone below the 450line,as is
depicted in Figure 1. Now MM intersects the 450linewhen R —R-R*12 + (D/d)(R-E),or
R— (dID)(R12) + E.This intersection will in turn be to the right of XL if




This latter condition ensures that the common intersection of LV, MM and XL lies below the
45° line, so that the possibilities are as shown in Figure 1.
We now have a complete picture of one possible case in Figure 1, which shows the full
range of possible outcomes. Figure 1 reflects constraint (32) and also, as we noted earlier, the
constraint E > R*. it is easy to find parameterizations of the model that satisfy these con-
straints. However, it also easy to see how the figure changes when these constraints fail. For
completeness, we record these changes in Table 2 below.
16Table 2
Alternative Possibilities
E> [(1-d+2D)12D]R MM, LV and XL intersect above the 450line,so SOPL
ceases to be possible; the other four feasible zones re-
main.
[(1-d÷2D)I2D]R >E>R*Figure 1 applies as shown.
R >E XL is to the left of XX and R <Ron XX; since our
model requires R ￿ R', X and XSPL cease to be possi-
ble: exporting can never occur in equilibrium.
IV. The Influence of Basic Parameters
Theprevious section offered a reduced-form analysis in the sense that alternative equilibria
were related to potential outcomes such as E, R, E* and R* rather to the basic parameters of
the model presented in section H. This was to make a complex situation a little more
transparent (our model has a lot of basic parameters) and also to add some robustness by
making clear that our arguments apply to any model generating such potential outcomes. This
section, though, takes a step back to offer some general observations about how the results
shown in Figure 1 and Table 2 relate to some of the more important basic parameters.
First consider the role of G. Since we hold the foreign market size constant, we cart
interpret increases in C as either decreases in the importance of knowledge capital relative to
physical capital or costly-to-transfer technology, or as decreases in foreign market size.
17Consider a reductioninC (e.g., an increaseinthe importance ofknowledgecapital relative
tophysical capital). Equations (6) and (13) imply thatreductions inC raiseRand (1-a)E *equal
amounts: they correspond to movements up and to the right parallel to the 450linein Figure
1. Thus if the initial arrangement is exporting, it eventually changes to XSPL or to TFL.
Similarly, the equation for XL indicates that XSPL may switch to SOPL. Reviewing the
equations for LL and LV along with equations (9), (10), and (13), we see that a decrease in G
increases the left-hand sides of LL and LV and the right-hand sides are either constant (LL) or
falling (LV). Thus a TPL tends to switch to an MNE and an MNE tends to switch to SOPL.
There are two basic implications of a fall in G. First, it improves the attractiveness of
producing in F relative to exporting (reflected in the results that X or XSPL switches to
producing in F in both periods, or at least one period in the case of the initial X). This is
brought out most forcefully by the possibility that, because it raises R* but not E, a fall in G
might switch us into the regime R >Ewhich, as is recorded in Table 2, predudes exporting
completely. But secondly, a fall in G increases the gains to H and F from defecting in the
second period. This shows up in our result that TPL can switch to an MNE or an MNE can
switch to SOPL. In summary, a fall in C (increase in the relative importance of knowledge
capital) increases the likelihood of producing in one or both periods in F and, given two-period
production in F, moves the contract from a license to a rent-sharing MNE to a succession of
one-period licenses. The latter occurs at a value of G that is so low that defection is inevitable.
Thus as the importance of knowledge capital increases, H first begins to share rents and then
inevitably finds it preferable to dissipate some rent and capture all of the smaller pie.
An even more limited role may be played by N, the number of firms competing in H to
develop new products. The primary effect of a rise in N on Figure 1 is to flatten MM and LV
and to shift them downwards, so that both approach LL in the limit. This expands the XSPL
and SOI'L regions at the expense of the MNE region: the comxnitnient of the H firm to supply
future products becomes less valuable as research competition intensifies because the firm can
expect to develop fewer new products successfully. The regions corresponding to exporting
18and to two-period licenses are not affected directly by changes in N. But in addition to these
direct effects, a rise in N produces indirect consequences due to its externality of decreasing G.
If this externality is significant, the consequences of a fall in G that were just described must
be added to the direct effects of the rise in N.
Now consider the role of t, the tariff/transportation cost per unit of exports. Refer again to
Figure 1, and note that increases in I do not affect LL and LV. Increases in I move us vertically
upwards, from (6) and (13). Thus for very small I, we are in the TPL region, for medium levels
of I we move into the MNE region, and for still larger I SOPL become the equilibria, if we are
to the right of XL. Increases in I also lower E, from (7), so they shift XX and XL to the left,
thereby making exporting less likely and causing XSPL to correspond to smaller values of R.
High transfer costs render exporting unattractive, but they also make it difficult to sustain
a two period agreement since they make it easier for F to defect ((1-a)E increases with I). At
a certain level of I, a two-period license can no longer be supported but the subsidiary can be,
due to the present value of future rents to subsidiary employees. But for still larger 1. rents
from violating outweigh future rents from respecting, so only SOPL can be sustained. The
effects of high transfer costs on XSPL are ambiguous: they make exporting unattractive, but
with defection more likely, waiting for the second period to find a foreign partner may be the
best that H can do. Geometrically, increases in I shift MM up, thereby reducing the size of the
XSPL region (as it moves to the left). But they also cause us to move vertically up, so the effect
on the likelihood of being in the XSPL region is unclear.
Consider next the role of d. High values indicate low discounting (d ￿ 1). With reference
again to Figure 1, note that (1-a)E and R do not depend on d, and neither do LL and XX.
Thus in the exporting or two-period licensing regions, d is irrelevant. Consider the MNE
region. A decrease in d shifts LV and MM down and we eventually jump to XSPL or SOPL:
increases in time preference reduce the value of future products to F and thus increase the
incentive to defect. They also make H less willing to wait until the second period to extract
rent: XL shifts to the left, expanding the SOPL region at the expense of the XSPL region.
19Finally, consider w,thewage in F relative to that in H. From (7) and (8), an increase in w
raisesR* in proportion and raises E proportionally more. MM falls and XL shifts rig1t. Thus
an increase in wmakesexporting in one or both periods more likely. From (6) and (13) an
increase in w also raises R in proportion and (1-a)E in lesser proportion, thereby causing
movements to below LL or LV from positions on or slightly above either. Thus, if we are
initially in SOPL, there is a tendency to move from SOPL to MNE to TPL as w rises: relatively
higher production costs in F make exporting from H a more potent second-period threat and
second-period defection less of a threat.
Table 3
Circumstances Leading to Alternative Equilibria
0 d t to N
X H -L H [L)-
XSPL H,M L ? H (MIH
SOPL L L H L (HIH
MNE M,L H M L,M EMIL
TPL H,M - L M (L,M]-
In Table 3, 1-1,. M or L indicates whether high, medium or low parameter values make the
respective arrangement the most likely outcome. Bracketed terms in the N column apply if
external effects are important (and therefore involve significant changes in G) and the
unbracketed terms when externalities are limited.
20V. International Equilibrium
Ofthe parameters in Table 3, two are endogenous: wandN. We examine this international
equilibrium.It should surprise no one that it can assume many forms, depending on
exogenous parameters. We do not attempt to be exhaustive but instead treat in some detail
the case R >E.This necessarily holds for sufficiently small wbecauseE 0 if wc< 1+
whileR >0even for an arbitrarily small (but positive) w,ifthe term in brackets in (8) is
positive. As wrises,E rises relative to R* and will eventually overtake it, but not within the
relevant interval 0 ￿w ￿ 11(1 + 1)if G is sufficiently small and/or t sufficiently large. This is
clear from (7) and (8). We assume this. Thus only TPL, MNE and SOPL are possibilities.
A.Equilibrium
Considerfirst the TPL case. Assume that preferences in H are identical to those in F, so
that bh —c/li', whereii'denotesthe labor force in H. Recall that the successful H firm
conducts research for two periods and then exploits its advantage during the next two periods.
Thus a(N, w),thepayoff to a successful research project, discounted to the commencement of
that project, is given by the following, with a TPL.
(N,w) -d2(1 + - G(] + [ci)2 - G(M]
1
Thelabor devoted to research incurs a present-value cost of (1 +d)p,where d denotes the
discount factor. Thus free entry into research implies that N must satisfy
i(N,w)- (1+d)p.




Assumefor simplicity that the externality C' is insignificant and can be ignored —wewill
describe in a footnote how things would change were this not so. The respective partial
derivatives of the above equilibrium condition are then
-- p; -d2[(c _1)2 -
G]
>o. (36)
The condition 4 —0is depicted in Figure 2. Old goods are produced in F. If they are also
produced in H.. competition requires that the relative wage satisfy w(1 +C)—1,assuming that
C units of F labor are required to move each old good from F to H. Let N° solve (34) if w —
1J(1+t), sothat N N° if any old goods axe produced in H.
If instead of TPL we are in MNE or SOFL, the appropriately lower-valued term must be
substituted into the expression for i-.Thisreducesbut leavesunchanged, so the graph
of 4i —0becomes flatter. As we saw in the previous section, lower values of w make first
MNE and then SOPL more likely. Figure 2 accordingly represents a case9 where the
equilibrium is TFL above w, MNE between w, and w and SOPL below wLV. Let L" denote
the supply of H labor and y"(w)thesupply of new goods to the H market:
yil(w)__f__I (37)
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The condition X —0is depicted in each panel of Figure 2. •lsoquants corresponding to
positive production of old goods in H lie below and to the left of the X —0contour. The figure
shows equilibrium in the alternative cases where old goods are and are not produced in H:
If N° ￿ N1: N -N°;y -X(N°,__);w -
1+1 1+t
(40)
If N° > N1: y —0— X(N,w); -p(1+d)
B. Country Size
Nowthat we have explicit expressions for and X, it is straightforward to do comparative
statics and directly relate various outcomes to particular values of the exogenous parameters
such as I, c,dand p.Forexample, we can derive a specific condition for N1 > N. We leave
most such exercises to the determined reader, but will illustrate with a discussion of the effect
of country size.
Foreignlabor. Considerfirst the role played by L, the labor force in F. Variations in L vary the
demands for both old and new goods in F, but under present assumptions these are met
entirely by local production: nothing is exported from H. Thus such variations have no direct
effect on the H labor market: our explicit expression for X is independent of the parameter L.
Instead, a change in L impacts H by altering the profitability of selling new goods in F,
influencing the incentive to undertake research in H. A rise in L directly lowers b in (35),
shiftingri —OupinFigure2. Asisclearfromthefigure,ifN > N°,sooldgoodsareinitially
produced in H, this causes no change in relative wages w but N —N°rises to the full extent
of the shift in —0.As we move up onto successive X contours, production of old goods in
H falls: H labor is reallocated from old-good production to research. This is because the rise
23in L has increased the profitability of selling new goods in F, increasing the license fee received
by the successful H researcher, causing all firms to intensify research. The higher license fees
are paid with exports of old goods from F, replacing the lowered H production.1° Note that
the rise in L has increased specialization: H does more research and F exports more old goods.
If instead N1 <Ne,either because this was the case initially or because the shift in —0
brings it about, equilibrium moves up along X —0,with w failing as N continues to rise, but
by less than the full shift in —0.What's happening now is that, with no old goods
produced in H, the labor for increased research can come only from lowering the production
of new goods.Thedemand for researchers in I-I drives up H wages (thereby lowering w);this
makes the sale of new goods in H less profitable, so production is cut back, releasing labor for
research. But this also partially negates the increase in the value of winning the research race
brought about by the increase in license fees, so the increase in N is moderated. The fall in w
also makes the threat of second period exports from H less powerful, so if the fail is great
enough it may no longer be possible to sustain TPL and equilibrium would shift to MNE or
even to SOPL. Whilewis lowered by tite upward shift in 4 —0,the increase in L that causes
this directly raises wi.., since the latter two are positively related by the equation for the LL
locus. Eventually w will fall below w& whetherthisoccurs within the relevant range depends
of course on the paxameterization.
Home Labor. AriseinL11directlylowersb'in(35),shifting —Oupanalogouslytoarisein
L: the reward to selling new goods rises and induces additional research so N increases. Only





The X —0locus is affected directly by the rise in L' in two countervailing ways: the rise
itself constitutes an increased labor supply, but the higher profitability from new goods




The numerator of (42) is positive, so the effect on labor supply dominates that on labor
demand.Thus theX —0locus must also shift up in response to an increase in L'1.
Ifinitially N' > N° an increase in L' produces basically the same results as an increase in
L. except that the shift in the X —0locus moderates (and may even reverse) the decline in the
a
productionofoldgoodsinH. WithN' <N', theshiftinX —OmagrtffiestheincreaseinN
caused by the rise in ii' and moderates or reverses the fall in w.
Comparison of (41) and (42) reveals that the locus X —0shifts more than the 4) —0locus




Sincethe right hand side of this inequality is necessarily negative for all c in the interval
[1, 1 +(21d2)], thisis a weak condition so the more interesting case occurs when it is satisfied:
the labor-market equilibrium locus X -0shifts more. Then if initially N' > N' an increase in
causes the inequality to widen: w does not change and H continues to produce old goods.
if initially N' < N'wemove up and to the right along the shifting 4) —0locus: research
intensifies but the greater labor supply depresses wages in H. Since w, is invariant with
respect to L' (recall footnote 9)wwill eventually rise above it if it is initially below, but, again,
whether this occurs within the relevant range depends on the parameterization. Also, the
initial inequality N' < N° may ultimately be reversed. Thus H production of old goods is
associated with a largehomecountry, and the larger the home country the more likely is it that
the equilibrium will feature TPL rather than MNE or SOPL. If instead (43) were violated and
it were the 4) —0locus that shifted the more, these conclusions would be reversed.
The bottom line to this is that international diversification (that is, the production of old
goods in H), relatively high F wages, and the TPL market mode are all associatedwith a large
25H economy and a small F.' Intense research activity is associated with large sizes of both
economies.
VI.Concluding Remarks
Thispaper draws on the empirical association between MNEs, knowledge-based assets, and
advanced technology to analyze the choice of mode for serving a foreign market. The joint-
input property of knowledge-based capital that supports MNE market structures in the first
place also implies a risk of asset dissipation when the knowledge capital is transferred to a
foreign firm. We assume that foreigners eventually learn to produce a good on their own, and
learn faster if the good is actually produced in their country than if it is imported. We also
assume that no contracts can enforce protection of intellectual property (knowledge capital),
which may be a preferred assumption in the international context to complete enforceability.
A home firm with a new product must choose between costly exporting and the early loss
of the value of its knowledge as a result of producing in the foreign country. When producing
within the foreign country, the home firm must choose between a product-specific license of
one or two periods and a subsidiary (becoming a MNE). The MNE structure is chosen when
(1) knowledge capital is of medium or high importance relative to physical capital, (2)
discounting is low so that commitments to future products are valuable, (3) exporting costs are
medium, so that exporting is not chosen yet some disincentive is provided to subsidiary
employees not to defect and face competition from exports, (4) the wage in F is low relative to
H to encourage production in F, and (5) fewer H firms compete in product development, so
that the subsidiary attaches a higher probability to successful new products.
In addition to exporting in both periods, a two-period license, and a subsidiary, the firm
may resort to successive one-period licenses or to exporting followed by a one-period license
when there exists no second-period license lee or share that would not lead one of the partners
to defect. The firm thus chooses among five modes of serving the foreign market. We related
each possible choice to the magnitudes of the five basic parameters. When exporting, a two-
26period license, or an MNE are chosen, all possible rents axe extracted from the foreign market.
The home firm retains all rents in the first two cases but shares them in the MNE mode. When
successive one-period licenses or exporting followed by a one-period license are chosen, some
rent is dissipated. The home firm finds the moral hazard problem severe enough so that it
prefers to dissipate some rent rather than to give up the share necessary to induce a
subsidiaryIlicensee not to defect.
Our analysis condudes with a description of general equilibrium in terms of basic
parameters. This is used to examine the effects of country size on the pattern of spedili.tion,
the choice of market mode, equilibrium relative wages and the intensity of research. This
paper has been confined to positive analysis, and we have made no attempt to describe the
welfare implications of alternative equilibria or to analyze the consequences of policy measures,
Instead we have developed a model that can be used for such purposes.
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Ethier (1986).
3. A subsidiary can be said to repudiate an MNE agreement if its employees quit to produce
a similar product on their own.
4. Thus we take as exogenous the length of time a race lasts and the effort expended by each
participant, and we also assume that research undertaken to develop one generation of new
goods has no effect on the success of research devoted to a subsequent generation. We model
the research process in this rudimentary way because we are less interested in the process itself
than in the way its results are exploited.
5. Note that with this formulation the appearance of a new good causes the consumer to derive
less satisfaction from old goods, rather than more from new goods. In effect, we rescale each
individual's utility function whenever a new good comes on the scene. This will not be
necessary for our basic results and we never add utilities across periods, but it will generate
a convenient stationary property. Note also that new goods are subject to diminishing
marginal utility but cease to be so once they become old. This is intended to represent a
learning process by consumers.
6. Note that we use the same notation for the schedule of repatriated earnings by an NINE and
for the license fee schedule. This is to conserve notation and to emphasize the parallelismbetween the two alternative arrangements. For convenience, our notation is summarized in
Table Al in the Appendix.
7. H cannot issue a second license to its original partner in any equilibrium, because in our full-
information model this would be equivalent to a TPL, which cannot be an equilibrium above
LL.
8. The results on the roles of G and tareconsistent with those of other theoretical papers such
as Horstmann and Markusen (1987a, 198Th, 1991) and Ethier (1986), and also with empirical
papers referenced in footnote 2.
.Wjis the value of wthatsatisfies the equation of the LL locus, and 4)(w)) arethe
values of w and N that simultaneously solve the equation of the LV locus and 4) — 0.Thus w
depends on the parameters c,t, Cand L, while WLVdependson these same parameters and
also on LH,p andd. Implicit derivation of the equation for the LL locus reveals that dw/dL>
0. 01 course not all permissable values of these parameters will result in solutions for w and
w, that lie in the relevant region (0, 11(1 + t)1,sonot all three sections of the 4) —0locus need
be relevant, but it is easy to find parameter values that ensure this.
10. We are describing a comparison of steady states, not the process of moving from one steady
state to another.
11. Our analysis in this section has been based on the as.ption that the externality G' is
sufficiently small that it can be ignored. If this is not so, the externalities associated with an
increase in N would tower the costs world-wide of produdng new goods. In addition, the
externality adds a positive term to both 4) and XN. Should this be large enough to make both
positive, the slopes of 4) —0and X —0would both reverse, contours corresponding to positive
H production of old goods would lie above X —0,and N'>N' wouldresult in an equilibrium
where H produces old goods. Furthermore, the positive terms added to 4) and XNwouldbe
unequal, so, as the externalities G' become more pronounced, these expressions would not
both change signs at the same time. This implies that there would be a range of externalitiesthat wouldcause —0tobe the more responsiveto changes in L',sothat a small home
country-size would make TPL and home production of old goods more likely.
12. H might also offer an MNE arrangement after exporting in the first production period. But
we ignore this because we are interested in equilibria that can emerge as steady state situations,
and since a MNE is by assumption a permanent relation, such a transition could occur but
once.Appendix
ThisAppendix contains several aids to help the reader keep track of the argwnent in Section
III, Choice of Supply Mode: a list of our notation, a description of the choice as a game
between players in H and F (to give an overview of the argument), and a table describing the
various loci.
Table Al: Notation
R monopoly rent from a local plant
E monopoly rent from exporting
R* total duopoly rent with two local plants
R*12 duopoly rent per firm with two local plants
E' total duopoly rent with exports and one local plant
(1-a)E'local plant's share of E*
aE exporter's share of E
w wage in F relative to H
(Q1, Q2)two-period license-fee or repatriation-of-earnings schedule
Q one period license fee
Q* second period license fee from second licensee
d discount factor (d —(1+r)if ris discount rate)
(C1, C)compensation paid by home firm in MNE contract
V present value to F in future (beyond the first two periods) MNE contract.A Game-TreeParable
Ourmodel reqires that any feasible arrangement be incentive compatible. A convenient way
to examine this is to describe the production of a new good as a two-period game between H
and a potential partner in F and to look for subgame perfect equilibria. These will correspond
to the feasible arrangements.
The game tree is shown in Figure Al. In the first play of the game, H chooses either to
export directly (X), to offer a license (L), or to offer an MNE arrangement (M).
If exporting is chosen, or if all potential F reject a license or MNE arrangement offered
instead, H must export in the first production period and choose whether to export agi in
the second period or to offer a license.u If H chooses X,orif it chooses L and all potential
F reject this, H exports in both production periods. If H chooses L and some F accepts, H
exports in the first period and licenses in the second.
If H chooses L or M in the first play, and if F accepts either the contract or the MNE
arrangement, then H decides whether to honor or violate the contract at the beginning of the
second period, where violating means that H negotiates a second license with a new licensee
at the beginning of the second period. Suppose that H decides to respect the contract. F can
in turn respect or violate. If F respects, the game ends. If F violates, he can either continue
to produce against H as a duopolist, or go-it-alone (GIA) (not participate in producing this
good).
Suppose instead that H violates. There is no meaning to F respecting in this case. F only
has the choice of continuing to produce against the new licensee or going-it-alone.
A licensing contract which both players respect, if it emerges as an equilibrium of this game,
corresponds to an incentive-compatible two-period license. Suppose instead that a license
contract is agreed upon and that H respects it, but F violates. Assume for simplicity that H
would not have time enough to negotiate a new license once the violation is revealed at the
beginning of the second period, and must therefore resort to exporting. F will violate by
continuing to produce, since it cannot do as well by leaving the industry. Such an equilibrium
















































































































































































































































 was anMNE which F violates, the game proceeds exactly as just described: the second-period
payoffs when H respects and F violates are exactly the same whether a license or a subsidiary
was the initial contract.
Now suppse that a license contract is agreed upon, but H violates by issuing a second
license. F will continue to produce, and such an equilibrium corresponds to successive one-
period licenses.
If the initial agreement was an MNE and H violates, the game proceeds exactly as just
described. The second-period payoffs when H violates and F also violates, either by continuing
to produce or by going-it-alone, are the same regardless of whether the initial agreement was
a license or an MNE.
Table A2: Loci
XX R —E To the left of XX, Xntustbe the equilibrium.
To the right of XX, XSPL dominates X.
LL(1.a)E* —R-R12 Below LL(and right of XX)TPListhe equilibri-
um. Above LL TPL cannot be an equilibrium.
LV(1-a)E —(R-R'12)+D(R-R) [D—d21((1-d2)N)JMNE dominates SOPL
below LV and MM; SOPL dominates MNE
above LV.
MM(1-a)E—(R-R/2)+(DId)(R - E) (D —d21((i-d2)N))Above MM, X or XSPL
dominates MNE; below MM, MNE dominates
XorXSPL.
XLdR* +(1-d)R—£ SOPL dominates XSPL right of XL while XSPL
dominates SOPL left of XL.